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Urbanization, the Intelligentsia, and 
Meaning Change: A Comment on 
Horacio Spector’s Value Pluralism              
and the Two Concepts of Rights 
CHRISTOPHER T. WONNELL* 
Professor Horacio Spector presents an interesting account for how a 
plurality of values can sneak its way into our normative world under the 
guise of unitary terminology.1 In particular, the rhetoric of rights was 
once primarily used to refer to moral protections extended to spheres of 
autonomous, individual decisionmaking.  Over time, however, rights 
were used to depict any claims in which individuals could assert that 
particular preferences of theirs were of sufficient weight to warrant their 
protection by law. 
Professor Spector also presents a kind of causal theory for how this 
metamorphosis occurred.2  Values are emanations from forms of life, but 
they can outlast the forms that brought them into being.  Rights as 
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 1. See Horacio Spector, Value Pluralism and the Two Concepts of Rights, 46 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 819 (2009). 
 2. Id. at 821 (“New value paradigms coexist with older value paradigms because 
the latter are central to forms of life that continue to define people’s senses of identity 
and meaningfulness.  By the same token, values are incommensurable with one another 
because each value presupposes a distinct form of life that cannot be ranked 
along an ordering of forms of life.  That is, values are incommensurable with 
each other due to the incommensurability of their supporting forms of life.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
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autonomous decisionmaking were a natural response to sparsely 
populated rural settings; one imagines a farmer standing proudly in a 
remote field as lord of his manor.  They became increasingly obsolete as 
the world became urban and interdependent—where no man was an 
island, and the consequences of individual choices were rarely limited to 
defined private spheres.  We might have responded to this change in 
objective conditions by abandoning rights talk as “nonsense upon stilts” 
and embracing the modernity of utilitarian or consequentialist theories 
that see the individual as a moral resource for the community.3  Instead, 
rights talk became ubiquitous—individuals are claimed to have rights to 
an education, healthcare, housing, and the rights to be free from torture, 
cruel punishments, and discrimination.  But most of these uses of the 
term rights are not best conceptualized as protections for spheres of 
autonomous decisionmaking.  The individual’s interests may have pride 
of place in these conceptions, but the dominant idea is sympathy for the 
welfare of the individual rather than respect for the autonomous capacity 
for making choices and plans. 
In my view, Professor Spector’s paper is more persuasive in 
identifying the rhetorical change that has taken place than in providing a 
causal account of its genesis.  The traditional rights of private property 
and freedom of contract do seem a long way from the new rights to 
receive medical care or safe and affordable housing.  However, the rural-
to-urban hypothesis for the cause of this change is not especially 
persuasive.  Laissez-faire thinking of autonomous private spheres was at 
its height in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, among 
conditions far more urban and commercial than had historically been the 
case and among countries such as England and Holland that were more 
urban than most at the time.4  It has also made a remarkable comeback in 
the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries in countries where 
urban crowding can make Manhattan seem bucolic. 
I do not want to overstate the criticism.  It is certainly true that the 
ability of people to do whatever they want with what they own can be 
challenged by conditions of urban living.  For example, the animals I 
could keep on a farm are a nuisance in the city.  And subtle environmental 
problems such as the depletion of the ozone layer remind us that local 
decisions in a hugely populated and technologically powerful world can 
have consequences far beyond any defined physical sphere.  Broad 
 
 3. Jeremy Bentham, Anarchical Fallacies, in NONSENSE UPON STILTS: BENTHAM, 
BURKE AND MARX ON THE RIGHTS OF MAN 46, 53 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1987). 
 4. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 25 (7th ed. 2007) (“Many 
legal doctrines date back to the nineteenth century, when a laissez-faire ideology based 
on classical economics was the dominant ideology of the educated classes.”). 
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environmental awareness, however, has been a rather recent phenomenon, 
and commentators had administered an enormous beating to private 
rights for a hundred years before the Clean Air Act.5  Moreover, it is 
perfectly possible to tackle environmental problems by creating new 
spheres of autonomous decisionmaking through careful institutional use 
of rights, such as tradeable pollution permits. 
In any event, there is something fundamentally wrong about the theory 
that regards interdependence and complexity as inconsistent with 
spheres of private jurisdiction or rights.  The system of private spheres is 
one that connects all owners of property—including property in labor—
in a worldwide network of contractual relations.  It is precisely because 
people are interdependent that it is essential to receive ongoing signals 
about changing relative scarcities everywhere on the planet, and that is 
the principal function of the system of private spheres of property 
connected by free contract.  The institution of private rights is really 
nothing but a mechanism for internalizing the externalities that arise 
from increasing interdependence.  If one thinks of the issue as status 
versus contract, then the more complex the world becomes, the more 
incredible it is to imagine that the state could be on top of every potential 
status that could arise and would know the rules to optimally govern 
persons in that status, including the prices that every producer should 
charge. 
If the change from simple rural to complex urban conditions is not a 
compelling hypothesis for the definitional metamorphosis of the word 
rights, what is?  Perhaps we should ask, in the manner of a detective 
investigation, who benefitted from the change in meaning?  The older 
conception of rights is one of jurisdictional limits, of respect for the 
autonomous decisionmaking of others, and of the necessity to refrain 
from intervening in defined spheres.  In contrast, the newer conception 
of rights is one of restructuring end states to ensure that individuals have 
particular interests satisfied.  The beneficiaries of the change in meaning 
are those people who chafe under the jurisdictional limits of the earlier 
rights approach and who yearn for the power to rearrange end states in 
order to enable themselves to author reforms that will help save 
individual victims of the previous end states. 
It is possible that several different groups of people would benefit 
from this change, but the most obvious winners are those who make 
 
 5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671 (2003). 
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their living reimagining and—at least in aspiration—remaking the 
world.  Let us call this group the intelligentsia, which includes not only 
professors in academia but also journalists and policy wonks in 
government.  The idea of large private spheres that are off limits 
to intervention is anathema to the interests and worldview of the 
intelligentsia.  After all, these spheres contain the resources that are 
needed for building the newly imagined worlds.  And intellectuals are 
especially disinclined to defer to the decisionmaking authority of 
nonintellectuals, people who are often uneducated, inarticulate, and wise 
only in pragmatically knowing how, rather than in theoretically knowing 
that.  In support of the hypothesis of intelligentsia power, one can note 
that freedom of speech and of the press is the one sphere of off-limits 
jurisdictional limitation that has thrived and expanded in the last 
century.6 
Rights is not the only term that has undergone the metamorphosis that 
Professor Spector identifies.  Other normative terms, such as justice, 
have also been rethought in directions that feed the appetite for power of 
the intellectual classes.  Justice was once thought of as a constraint on 
human actions.7  It was unjust to lie, break promises, steal, kill, or maim.  
These deontic constraints can be a frustration for the impatient 
intellectual, especially one with radical or revolutionary aspirations.  
How much happier it is to think of justice as a property of desirable end 
states that can be achieved by imagining comprehensive rearrangements 
of the elements on the human chess board! 
There is no need to postulate illiberal or otherwise unattractive 
motives for the intelligentsia; indeed, imagining such motives would 
misunderstand the essential process that took place.  Normative 
philosophers who thought about concepts like rights and justice were 
usually trying to hold onto as much of the older conceptions of the terms 
as they felt they could in good conscience and were trying to come up 
with newer conceptions that would better promote the attractive features 
of the earlier values.  Most people who speak of rights strongly desire to 
see the individual human being flourish and specifically hope to ensure 
that identity will not be lost in an abstract collective.  Similarly, “social 
justice” is often thought of as being especially protective of the status of 
the individual—an improvement on utilitarian norms that would allow 
the sacrifice of one individual, without limit, if required to promote 
 
 6. Mark A. Graber, Old Wine in New Bottles: The Constitutional Status of 
Unconstitutional Speech, 48 VAND. L. REV. 349, 375 (1995) (noting the dramatic expansion 
of free speech rights in the third quarter of the twentieth century). 
 7. 2 F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL 
JUSTICE 33 (1976). 
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enough utility for the rest of the group.  The intelligentsia was trying to 
hold onto the best features of rights and justice rhetoric without building 
severe jurisdictional barriers on the only interventions that would make 
the securing of these conceptions of rights and justice possible. 
If Professor Spector’s hypothesis for the cause of meaning change in 
terms such as rights and justice is accepted, what are its implications?  In 
the end, I believe I would draw conclusions very similar to those of 
Professor Spector, notwithstanding our differences regarding causal 
origins.  The most important thing is to recognize that there are two 
different conceptions of rights and two different conceptions of justice.  
The conceptions are not similar enough to go by the same name without 
confusion.  Perhaps they both are enforceable claims of individuals, but 
the nature of those claims and their sources and rationales are too 
different to elide.  It is not a matter of the newer conceptions lacking 
value.  We surely do need concepts of rights and of justice that will 
stand as guarantors that the weakest among us are not simply abandoned 
and left to suffer.  But we also need the earlier concepts of rights as 
jurisdictional limitations and of justice as constraints on violating those 
limits, if we are to retain the vital benefits that come from such a system 
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